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Total Exhaustion of State Remedies in Habeas Corpus Proceedings: Rose
v. Lundy' — Habeas corpus is a post-conviction remedy available to both
federal and state prisoners.' The writ of habeas corpus is a judicial order to the
warden or official responsible for the custody of the prisoner, ordering him to
bring the prisoner before the court. 3 The habeas corpus proceeding is not an in-
quiry into the guilt or innocence of the prisoner, but rather a determination of
whether he was convicted in violation of his constitutional rights.* If a court
concludes that a prisoner is held in violation of either the Constitution, or the
laws and treaties of the United States, the prisoner may be released or his
sentence curtailed. 5
This remedy originated at English common law' and is specifically pro-
vided for in the United States Constitution.' The scope of the writ is not de-
fined in the Constitution, 5 but has developed at common law. 9 Since 1948, the
federal habeas corpus process has been governed by statute." The statute sets
' 102 S. Ct. 1198 (1982).
2 28 U.S.0 • 2241(c)(3) (1976). This section provides that federal habeas corpus relief
is available to anyone convicted of a criminal offense in violation of the United States Constitu-
tion, or any law or treaty of the United States. Id.
Federal habeas corpus relief was first extended to state prisoners by the Judiciary Act of
February 5, 1867, ch. 28 5 1, 14 Stat. 385-86, reprinted in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 441-45
(1963) (codified as amended 28 U.S.C. 5 2241(c)(3) (1976)).
3 There are several types of habeas corpus writs. The term "habeas corpus" unless
otherwise specified refers to habeas corpus ad subjiciendum. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 475 n.6
(1976) (citing Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807)).
The writ ad subjiciendum is "directed to the person detaining another, and demanding
him to produce the body of the prisoner, with the day and cause of his caption and detention, ..
to do, submit, and receive whatsoever the judge or court awarding such writ shall consider in that
behalf." Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 281 n.9 (citing 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
'131).
4 See, e.g., United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 211-12 (1952); Darr v, Burford,
339 U.S. 200, 203 (1950), overruled on other grounds, Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S: 391 (1963); Bowen v.
Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 23-24 (1939).
5 See, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 494 (1973); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,
401-02 (1963).
For a thorough account of the development of the writ in England, see R. SHARPE,
THE LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS (1976).
7 U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 9, cl. 2 provides that "[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety
may require it." U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 9, cl. 2.
See id.
9
 The early developments of the writ are traced in Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271,
274-76 (1945). The extent of federal habeas corpus relief has changed dramatically over the
years. What was once a truly extraordinary measure is now a commonly sought remedy. In
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, Justice Blackmun commented on the "extraordinary expan-
sion of the concept of habeas corpus" during the second half of the 20th century, remarking that
"we have come a long way from the traditional notions of the Great Writ." 410 U.S. 484, 510
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
For a recent and detailed history of developments in habeas corpus, see Developments in the
Law.. Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1038 (1970).
is Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 964-67 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 55 2241-2255
(1976).
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out guidelines for both prisoners and federal judges as to the procedure to be
followed in determining whether a writ will issue." The first step in the habeas
process is for a prisoner to present a petition to a federal judge." The petition
itself, however, must meet certain requirements before the judge may act upon
it. Moreover, the procedural requirements differ, depending on whether the
prisoner was convicted under federal or state law." This casenote will address
only the state prisoner's petition for federal habeas review. More specifically, it
will focus on the statutory requirement that state prisoners must exhaust their
claims in state court before petitioning the federal court for relief)*
This exhaustion doctrine is an example of the deference which federal
courts have traditionally shown to the state courts.' 5 Although the federal
courts have jurisdiction to hear the state prisoner's claims of constitutional
violation, they have nonetheless imposed restraints upon this power." Where a
proceeding involves federal review of state activity, the federal courts are
cautious not to interfere unduly with state court proceedings." This notion of
federal-state comity" obviously applies to the petitions for habeas corpus of
state prisoners. The requirement that state prisoners exhaust all of their state
remedies before petitioning the federal court both allows the state courts every
opportunity to correct constitutional error and minimizes federal in-
tervention."
Although the exhaustion doctrine has long been recognized as necessary to
insure federal-state comity in habeas proceedings," considerable debate has
arisen as to whether exhaustion requirements must be strictly observed in all
instances. 2 ' In particular, federal circuit courts have disagreed on how a federal
" Id.
12
 28 U.S.C. 5 2242 (1976).
' 3 Compare 28 U.S.C. 5 2254 (1976) (applies to state prisoners) with 28 U.S.C. 5 2255
(1976) (applies to federal prisoners).
" 28 U.S.C. 5 2254(b)-(c) (1976). Under the federal habeas corpus statute, a prisoner
convicted under state law must exhaust all available state avenues of relief before proceeding to
federal court to seek relief. See, e.g., Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276; Ex parte Hawk, 321
U.S. 114, 116-17 (1944) (per curiam).
" See, e.g., Gonzales v. Stone, 546 F.2d 807, 809 (1976); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S.
270, 275 (1971).
16 See, e.g., Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 250 (1971); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391, 418-19 (1963).
' 7 See, e.g., Duckworth v. Serrano, 102 S. Ct. 18, 19 (1981); Braden v. 30th Judicial
Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 490-91 (1973); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-76 (1971); Fay
v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 417-20 (1963); Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 116-17 (1944) (per curiam);
Ex parte Royal!, 117 U.S. 241, 251-53 (1886).
" See, e.g., Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971); Galtieri v, Wainwright, 582
F.2d 348, 356 (5th Cir. 1978); United States ex rd. Trantino v. Hatrack, 563 F.2d 86, 96 (3d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 928 (1978); Gonzales v. Stone, 546 F.2d 807, 809 (9th Cir. 1976);
Miller v. Hall, 536 F.2d 967, 968-69 (1st Cir. 1976); Tyler v. Swenson, 438 F.2d 611, 615 (8th
Cir. 1973).
19 See, e.g., Rose v. Lundy, 102 S. Ct. at 1201-02; Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 117
(1944); Ex parte Royal], 117 U.S. 241, 251 (1886).
2° See cases cited supra note 17.
2 ' Compare cases cited infra note 23 with cases cited infra note 28.
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district court judge should handle a petition from a state prisoner which con-
tains both some claims where all available state procedures have been ex-
hausted and others where such procedures have not been exhausted. Such a
petition has been commonly referred to as a "mixed petition."" A majority of
the circuits adopted a rule requiring the judge to review the exhausted claims
and dismiss the unexhausted claims in such a mixed petition. 23 The majority
rule approved review of the exhausted claims in a mixed petition, reasoning
that immediate review of those claims serves the prisoner's interest of swift
determination of his claims, and, if the claims are meritorious, allows for a
speedy release. 24 Moreover, the majority of the circuits argued, comity is
preserved by dismissal of the unexhausted claims." There is one noteworthy
exception to the majority rule that exhausted claims in mixed petitions should
be reviewed. The circuits following this rule would not review an exhausted
claim in a mixed petition if that claim were related to an unexhausted claim. 26
The rationale behind this view is that if an unexhausted claim is germane to an
issue raised by the exhausted one, it makes more sense to dismiss the exhausted
claim so that the two can be coherently presented together." In contrast to the
majority rule, the minority rule required the complete dismissal of mixed peti-
tions. 28 In this view, the preservation of federal-state comity required that
federal courts refuse to hear even the exhausted claims in a mixed petition."
These circuits reasoned that the state has an interest in resolving the entire case
before the federal system intervenes."
22 See, e.g., Galtieri v. Wainwright, 582 F.2d 348, 355 (5th Cir. 1978).
" See, e.g., Katz v. King, 627 F.2d 568, 574 (1st Cir. 1980); United States ex rel. Tran-
tino v. Hatrack, 563 F.2d 86, 95-96 n.20 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 928 (1978); Triplett
v. Wyrick, 549 F.2d 57, 59-60 (8th Cir. 1977); Miller v. Hall, 536 F.2d 967, 969 (1st Cir. 1976);
Cameron v. Fastoff, 543 F.2d 971, 976 (2d Cir. 1976); Tyler v. Swenson, 483 F.2d 611, 614-15
(8th Cir. 1973); Brown v. Wisconsin State Dep't of Public Welfare, 457 F.2d 257, 259 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 862 (1972); Hewett v. North Carolina, 415 F.2d 1316, 1320 (4th Cir. 1969);
Whiteley v. Meacham, 416 F.2d 36, 39-40 (10th Cir. 1969), reo'd on other grounds, 410 U.5. 560
(1971).
24 See, e.g., Miller v. Hall, 536 F.2d 967, 968-70 (1st Cir. 1976); United States ex rel.
Levy v. McMann, 394 F.2d 402, 404 (2d Cir. 1968); United States ex rel. Bovance v. Myers, 372
F.2d 111, 112 (3d Cir. 1967); United States ex rel. Savino v. Flood, 482 F. Supp. 228, 233
(E. D. N.Y. 1979).
" See cases cited supra note 23.
" See, e.g., Miller v. Hall, 536 F.2d 967, 969 (1st Cir. 1976); Johnson v. United States
District Court, 519 F.2d 738, 740 (8th Cir. 1975); United States ex rel. DeFlumer v. Mancusi,
380 F.2d 1018, 1019 (2d Cir. 1967); United States ex rd. Reid v. Dunham, 481 F. Supp. 366, 368
(E.D.N.Y. 1979); United States ex rel. Savino v. Flood, 482 F. Supp. 228, 233 (E.D.N.Y. 1978);
Zemina v. Solem, 438 F. Supp. 455, 460 (D.S.D. 1977).
27 See, e.g., Triplett v. Wyrick, 549 F.2d 57, 59 (8th Cir. 1977); United States ex rel.
Martin v. McMann, 348 F.2d 896, 898 (2d Cir. 1965); United States ex rel. Savino v. Flood, 482
F. Supp. 228, 232-34 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
28 See, e.g., Galtieri v. Wainwright, 582 F.2d 348, 355-56 (5th Cir. 1978); James v.
Reese, 546 F.2d 325, 327 (9th Cir. 1976); Gonzales v. Stone, 546 F.2d 807, 808-10 (9th Cir.
1976); Lamberti v, Wainwright, 513 F.2d 277, 283-84 (5th Cir. 1974).
29 See cases cited supra note 26.
" See id.
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The Supreme Court of the United States resolved the conflict of how to
treat mixed petitions in Rose v. Lundy. 3 ' Favoring the minority view, the Court
announced a total exhaustion rule, requiring the dismissal of all mixed peti-
tions. 32 According to the Court, this rule would further the purposes of the ex-
haustion doctrine without unreasonably impairing the prisoner's interest."
The controversy in Lundy arose when Noah Lundy petitioned the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee for federal habeas
corpus relief, claiming that his conviction for rape in Tennessee state court was
unconstitutional." The petition set out four grounds for relief." Despite the
fact that two of the claims were not exhausted, the federal district court con-
sidered them collaterally in order to assess the entire trial atmosphere."
Reviewing the entire record, the federal district court concluded that the trial
was infected by ten instances of prosecutorial misconduct. 37 Five of the in-
stances which the court identified were not raised before the state court, nor
were they raised in the prisoner's habeas petition. 38 Nevertheless, the district
court considered all of the instances of prosecutorial misconduct in reaching
their conclusion that petitioner Lundy did not have a fair tria1. 39 The decision
of the district court was upheld by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
without comment.°
In Rose v. Lundy, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a
federal judge may properly consider a petition for habeas corpus when the peti-
tioner has not exhausted all of his claims in state court.'" The Court disagreed
with the treatment of the habeas petition by the courts below, holding that
federal district courts must dismiss all claims in mixed petitions. 42 When a
mixed petition is rejected, the Court held, the petitioner has the choice of
3 ' 102 S. Ct. 1198 (1982).
32
 Id. at 1199.
" Id. at 1205.
" Id. at 1199. For the opinion of the state court, see Lundy v. State, 521 S.W.2d 591
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1974).
35 102 S. Ct. at 1199. The four grounds of the petition are set out by the Court:
(1) that the defendant was denied his right to confrontation because the trial court
limited defense counsel's questioning of the witness;
(2) that defendant was denied his right to a fair trial because the prosecutor stated
that defendant had a violent character;
(3) that defendant was denied his right to a fair trail because the prosecutor
remarked improperly in his closing that the State's evidence was uncontroverted;
and
(4) that the trial judge improperly instructed the jury that every witness is
presumed to tell the truth.
Id.
36 Id. at 1199-1200.
" Id. at 1200. The opinion of the Court sets out the ten instances of prosecutorial
misconduct which the district court identified. Id. at 1200 n.3.
" Id. at 1200.
39 Id.
1° Id, See Lundy v. Rose, 624 F.2d 1100 (6th Cir. 1980).
41




returning to state court to exhaust all of his claims or amending his petition to
the federal court by deleting all unexhausted claims."
Prior to the Lundy decision, only the Fifth and Ninth Circuits required
dismissal of petitions containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims. 44
The Court's rule, however, goes beyond the limits of the exhaustion rule of the
Fifth and Ninth Circuits. While these circuits found it preferable to dismiss
mixed petitions in their entirety, they would review exhausted claims in mixed
petitions if dismissal of the entire petition would seriously impair the prisoner's
rights, such as when undue delay had occurred." The Supreme Court seem-
ingly rejected any such flexibility in the treatment of mixed petitions by requir-
ing a "rigorously enforced total exhaustion rule". 46
This casenote submits that the total exhaustion rule upsets the balance
between the need for comity and the need to protect prisoners' rights. First,
this casenote delineates the Court's reasoning in Lundy. It then argues that the
total exhaustion rule is without support from either statutory language or
language found in Supreme Court opinions. In fact, both the statute and the
Court's past treatment of the exhaustion doctrine indicate that exhaustion is
only required as to the issues to be decided by the federal court. Next, this
casenote argues that the Court overestimated the effect that the total exhaus-
tion rule will have on federal-state comity. It is submitted that the Court failed
to consider circumstances in which the new rule may even be detrimental to
federal-state relations. The Court also overestimated the effect which the rule
would have on judicial efficiency in both state and federal courts. This casenote
argues that the Court's rigid rule overlooks the recognized need for flexibility
in the treatment of habeas petitions. Finally, this casenote concludes that the
Court gave insufficient weight to the prisoner's interest, by focusing solely on
the purposes underlying the exhaustion doctrine and not the fundamental pur-
poses of the writ of habeas corpus, itself.
I. THE COURT'S REASONING
The Lundy Court reached its decision that mixed petitions should be
dismissed by a federal district court by examining both the history and
language of the federal habeas corpus statute, and the policies underlying the
" Id.
" See cases cited supra note 28.
45
 See, e.g., Garrison v. McCarthy, 653 F.2d 374, 376 (9th Cir. 1981) (where district
court mistakenly hears exhausted claims in mixed petition, appellate court may address those
claims); Galtieri v. Wainwright, 582 F.2d 348, 360-61 (5th Cir. 1978) (Court of Appeals may
hear exhausted claims, even if there are unexhausted claims outstanding where district court
mistakenly considered exhausted claims); Gonzales v. Stone, 546 F.2d 807, 810 (9th Cir. 1976)
(dictum) (undue delay or reasonable explanation for failure to exhaust may allow consideration
for exhausted claims, despite existence of unexhausted claims in mixed petitions); West v.
Louisiana, 478 F.2d 1026, 1034-35 (5th Cir. 1973) (mixed petition reviewed even though all
claims were not exhausted when there was undue delay).
46 102 S. Ct. at 1203.
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exhaustion doctrine. 47 The Court found little guidance on how to handle mixed
petitions from either the statute or the case law which preceded the statute." In
particular, the Court noted that there is no specific reference to mixed petitions
in the statute on exhaustion." The statute rather, only provides that: "An ap-
plicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the
courts of the state, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under
the law of the state to raise by any available procedure, the question
presented." 5° The Court reasoned that this language is "too ambiguous" to
merit any conclusion about Congress' opinion on the proper disposition of
mixed petitions. 5 ' An examination of the legislative history of the statute was
equally fruitless from the Court's point of view. 52 The Court concluded,
therefore, that Congress most likely had never considered the issue of mixed
petitions."
The lack of either clear statutory language, Supreme Court authority, or
congressional directive on mixed petitions led the Court to examine the policies
underlying the exhaustion doctrine." The Court noted that from the late nine-
teenth century, the exhaustion doctrine was defined as one of comity, necessary
to preserve harmony between the federal and state judicial systems." More
recently, the Court pointed out in Duckworth v. Serrano, that the purpose of the
exhaustion doctrine is to "minimize friction" between the two systems of
government.'" Considering the issue of mixed petitions in light of the policy ex-
pressed in these earlier decisions, the Court determined that to allow federal
review on mixed petitions would undermine the standards of comity that the
exhaustion doctrine was designed to protect." According to the Court, a
"rigorously enforced total exhaustion rule" would instead further the goals of
the doctrine. 58 As a result of such a rule, the Court predicted, prisoners will
seek to raise all of their constitutional claims of error in state court before ap-
proaching the federal courts," Consequently, the Court recognized that the
state courts would have more opportunities to decide federal constitutional
issues and would "become increasingly familiar and hospitable" toward such
claims. 6°
47 Id. at 1201-03.
48 Id. at 1212. The Court noted that mixed petitions appear to be a relatively new
phenomenon. Id. at 1202-03 & n.11 (citing Note, Habeas Petitions with Exhausted and Unexhausted
Claims: Speedy Release, Comity and Judicial Efficiency, 57 B.U. L. REV. 864, 867 n,30 (1977)).
49 102 S. Ct. at 1202.
5° 28 U.S.C. $ 2254(c) (1976).
" 102 S. Ct. at 1202.
52 Id. at 1202-03.
" Id.
" Id. at 1203.
" Id. (quoting Ex parte Royal], 117 U.S. 241, 251 (1886)).
56 102 S. Ct. at 1203 (quoting Duckworth v. Serrano, 102 S. Ct. 18, 19 (1981)).
" 102 S. Ct, at 1202.
58 Id. at 1203-04.
" Id. at 1203.
60 Id.
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In addition to the promotion of comity and the benefits that the state
courts would derive from the total exhaustion rule, the Court reasoned that the
rule would also benefit the federal court system." The Court explained that ex-
haustion of all claims in state court would provide the district court judge with
a more complete factual record for review. 62
 The Court apparently concluded
that the record would be more complete since all issues in a petitioner's case
would be resolved as opposed to only some of his claims being resolved. A com-
pletely exhausted record, the Court explained, would not only reduce
piecemeal litigation, but also would afford the prisoner a more thorough
review. 63 Moreover, the Court predicted that federal judges would save time as
a result of the total exhaustion rule, since automatic dismissal of mixed peti-
tions would eliminate the step of deciding whether there are exhausted and
unexhausted claims which are interrelated."
Finally, the Court considered the effect of the dismissal of mixed petitions
on the prisoner. 65
 The Court identified the prisoner's interest as "speedy relief
of his federal claims." 66
 The Court did not elaborate on this point, however,
saying only that a "total exhaustion rule will not impair that interest since [the
prisoner] can always amend the petition to delete unexhausted claims, rather
than return to state court to exhaust all of his claims." 67
Four justices joined Justice O'Connor's opinion espousing a total exhaus-
tion rule." While two justices joined the opinion in its entirety, two justices
prevented a majority on one aspect of the total exhaustion rule as Justice
O'Connor defined it. 69
 According to the Court, the total exhaustion rule gives
the prisoner two options if a judge dismisses his petition because it is "mixed":
1) the petitioner can return to state court and exhaust his unexhausted claims
or 2) the petitioner can delete his unexhausted claims and proceed to federal
court with only his exhausted claims." Justice O'Connor and those justices
who joined her opinion in its entirety, would impose a further restriction on the
petitioner who chose the latter option. These justices concluded that the unex-
61 Id. at 1203-04.
62 Id.
67
 Id. at 1204.
64 Id.
65 Id at 1204-05.
65
 Id. at 1204.
67 Id.
66 Id. at 1198. Justice O'Connor's opinion was joined in part by Justices Rehnquist,
Brennan, Marshall, and Powell, Id.
69 Id. at 1210. (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justices Mar-
shall and Brennan dissented from the majority opinion on the issue of whether a prisoner who
chose to delete his unexhausted claims would risk forfeiting those claims under the abuse of the
writ standard of Rule 9(b). Id.
Justice White wrote a separate opinion concurring with Justice Brennan on the effect of
Rule 9(b) on the unexhausted claims in mixed petitions. Id. at 1213 (White, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Justice White, however, disagreed with the majority about adopting
a total exhaustion rule. Id.
70
 102 S. Ct. at 1199.
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hausted claims, once deleted from the petition, might never be properly con-
sidered in federal court, regardless of whether they were subsequently ex-
hausted." The members of the Court who supported this view relied on Rule
9(b) under Section 2254. 72 Justice O'Connor noted that Rule 9(b) seeks to
avoid abuse of the habeas corpus writ.' 3 In her view, the state prisoner who
presents a mixed petition and then chooses to delete his exhausted claims and
go forward, runs the risk of being charged with abusing the writ if he later
presents the claims he deleted in a petition for federal review. 74 Justice Bren-
nan, joined by Justice Marshall, agreed with the total exhaustion rule, but
adamantly refuted the implication that Rule 9(b) applies to the prisoner who
chooses to amend this mixed petition to include only exhausted claims."
Justice Brennan supported his position with language from Rule 9(b), its
legislative history, and Sanders v. United States, 76
 the Supreme Court case that
announced the "abuse of the writ" standard, cited by Justice O'Connor."
As Justice Brennan pointed out, the Sanders Court held that "fig a
prisoner deliberately withholds one of two grounds for federal collateral relief at
the time of filing his first application, in the hope of being granted two hearings
... he may be deemed to have waived his right to a hearing on a second ap-
plication presenting the withheld ground." 78 Justice Brennan argued that in
Rule 9(b), Congress went beyond the standard of the Sanders case by requiring
that the behavior of the prisoner must be "abusive" before a successive peti-
tion may be dismissed without consideration. 79 According to Justice Brennan,
"abusive" meant "knowingly and deliberately" withholding claims in order
to get more than one opportunity for federal review." Because the total ex-
haustion rule requires a prisoner who presents a mixed petition to return to state
court to exhaust all of his remedies or to delete his unexhausted claims and pro-
ceed only with his exhausted claims, 81 Justice Brennan argued that a peti-
tioner's choice to follow the latter route cannot be considered a deliberate
withholding within the meaning of Rule 9(b). 82
71 Id. at 1204-05.
72 28 U.S.C. 2254, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 9(b) (1976). Rule 9(b)
provides:
A second or successive petition may be dismissed if the judge finds that it fails to
allege new or different grounds for relief and the prior determination was on the
merits or, if new and different grounds are alleged, the judge finds that the failure of
the petitioner to assert those grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the
writ.
Id.
73 102 S. Ct. at 1204. For the text of Rule 9(b), see supra note 72.
" 102 S. Ct. at 1204.
75 Id. at 1210-11.
76 Id. at 1211 (citing Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963)).
" 102 S. Ct. at 1204.
78 Id. (quoting Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. at 18).
79 102 S. Ct. at 1211.
8° Id. at 1212.
8 ' Id. at 1199.
82 Id. at 1213.
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Justice Blackmun filed an opinion, rejecting the total exhaustion rule."
While agreeing with the majority that Section 2254 was silent on the issue of
mixed petitions," Justice Blackmun asserted that the total exhaustion rule
could be "read into the statute only by force."" Moreover, according to the
Justice, precedent suggested that the exhausted claims in mixed petitions
should be reviewed." He noted that former Supreme Court decisions did not
mandate that state courts be given every opportunity to address a prisoner's
claim before federal review was proper."
Justice Blackmun agreed with the majority that federal-state comity is the
fundamental purpose of the exhaustion doctrine." He argued, however, that
dismissal of unexhausted claims from mixed petitions adequately served
that purpose. 89 Furthermore, Justice Blackmun anticipated that the Court's
new rule would complicate the habeas corpus process. He argued that total ex-
haustion would produce delays, rather than promote efficiency." A significant
delay would result, in his opinion, from sending unexhausted claims that are
frivolous back to state court for adjudication, when there are meritorious ex-
hausted claims to be resolved." Justice Blackmun also expressed concern about
the effect which the new rule would have on prisoners." Noting that many
prisoners draft their own petitions, 93 the Justice pointed out that prisoners who
Filed mixed petitions might not understand their alternatives and the conse-
quences of their choice." He noted that if a prisoner chose to delete his unex-
hausted claims, the petitioner would have to start the process over, unless the
federal judge took it upon himself to delete the claims." If federal judges made
a habit of deleting unexhausted claims for the prisoners, Justice Blackmun
argued that there would be no difference between this option under the new
rule and the rule which was formerly followed by a majority of the circuits."
Justice Blackmun concurred in the Court's judgment because, consistent
with the majority's ruling, he would have remanded the case to the district
court." Justice Blackmun, however, would have remanded the case so that the
district court could have determined whether the exhausted claims in Lundy's
petition were related to the unexhausted claims." Presumably, Justice
83
 Id. at 1205 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
" Id. at 1206.
89
 Id. at 1205.




go Id, at 1205.
91 Id. at 1207.
" Id. at 1209- 10.
93 Id. at 1208-09.
9+ Id. at 1209-10.
95
 Id.
96 Id. at 1209.
97 Id. at 1210.
98
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Blackmun agreed with the rule of the majority of circuits prior to the Lundy
decision — that while exhausted claims in mixed petitions should ordinarily be
reviewed, exhausted claims which are related to unexhausted claims should be
dismissed. 99
Justice Stevens also filed an opinion, dissenting from the Court's total ex-
haustion rule.'°° According to Justice Stevens, federal judges should have
broad discretion as to whether to dismiss a mixed petition entirely or to hear
the exhausted claims in the petition.'" If the exhausted claims are of a serious
nature, he argued, it makes no sense to delay the resolution of those claims.'"
On the other hand, if the unexhausted claims indicate serious constitutional er-
ror, Justice Stevens would require the petition to be dismissed so that the state
court could resolve their errors.'° 3 Justice Stevens argued further that the "true
office" of the writ should determine the disposition of a prisoner's petition.'"
He identified the "true office" of the writ as a guarantee of freedom from
"fundamental unfairness" with respect to an individual's constitutional
rights.' 05 According to Justice Stevens, federal judges should assess the
seriousness of a prisoner's exhausted claims in light of this guarantee, rather
than according to the procedural history of the petitioner's claims.'"
Clearly several views exist among the justices as to whether federal courts
should be allowed to review the exhausted claims in mixed petitions. The ma-
jority opinion held exhausted claims in mixed petitions may not be reviewed,
unless all other claims are exhausted or the prisoner avoids a mixed petition
situation by deleting his unexhausted claims from the petition. The members of
the Court who disagreed with the total exhaustion rule would ordinarily allow
exhausted claims in mixed petitions to be reviewed. Although the,majority
argued that the new rule would promote federal-state comity, decrease the
burden on the federal courts, and leave the prisoner's rights unimpaired,
Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens argued for a variety of reasons that there
is little merit to the Court's conclusions. The following sections will analyze the
Court's approach to mixed petitions and the validity of its reasoning as to the
benefits which the new rule would produce.
II. INTERPRETING SECTION 2254
This section addresses the Court's interpretation of the exhaustion re-
quirement as set out in Section 2254(c). Although all courts apparently have
agreed that the statute does not specifically address mixed petitions, this section
99 See cases cited supra notes 23 & 24.
100 102 S. Ct. at 1213 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1 " Id. at 1217.
102 Id.
"3 Id.
104 Id. at 1218.
"Th Id.
06 Id. at 1219-20.
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points out that most of the circuit courts found some language in the statute to
support their position that a petition need not contain only exhausted claims
before federal review is proper. This section also discusses Supreme Court
cases which these circuits have relied on to further justify this interpretation of
Section 2254(c).
The Lundy Court began its analysis of the mixed petition dilemma with an
inquiry into the language and legislative history of Section 2254(b)-(c), which
addresses the requirement that state prisoners exhaust state remedies before fil-
ing petitions in federal court."' The Court, however, found no evidence that
Congress had given any consideration to the issue of mixed petitions.'" As the
Court recognized, the language in the statute refers only to exhaustion of "the
question presented" and does not indicate whether "the question presented"
should be read to apply to all claims in the petition, taken as a whole, or to each
claim individually within the petition.'" The interpretation of the Lundy Court
is that the term "the question presented" refers to the entire petition. Conse-
quently, to fulfill the statutory requirement of exhaustion, every claim in the
petition would have to be exhausted; otherwise, the petition would have to be
dismissed. Although finding nothing in the language or legislative history of
the statute to support a requirement that all claims in a petition for federal
review must be exhausted, the majority opinion argued that there was nothing
to prohibit such an interpretation."° In so concluding, the Court rejected the
statutory interpretation followed by a majority of the circuit courts."' These
circuits read "the question presented" in its narrowest sense to mean the in-
dividual claim in the petition."' According to this interpretation, a federal
judge would look at each constitutional claim in the petition, applying the re-
quirement of exhaustion to each one. Consequently, according-to the circuit
courts adopting this view, any claim in the petition which was exhausted
satisfied the statutory requirement and could be hearcl." 3
Neither approach to interpreting the statute is clearly satisfactory. The
Lundy Court's approach is to dismiss any search for literal meaning and pro-
ceed immediately to the policies underlying the statute." 4 On the other hand,
the approach of the majority of the circuits, reading the "question presented"
to imply that Congress intended exhausted claims in mixed petitions to be con-
sidered seems to be overreaching if based only on the ambiguous statutory
language. The latter interpretation does, however, find support in other
sources which the Lundy Court apparently overlooked.
" 7 Id. at 1201-02.
laa Id. at 1202-03 & n.11.
109 Id. at 1202.
"° Id. at 1203.
"' Id. See cases cited infra at note 112.
1 " See, e.g., Miller v. Hall, 536 F.2d 967, 969 (1st Cir. 1976); Tyler v. Swenson, 483
F.2d 611, 613-15 (8th Cir. 1973).
13 See cases cited supra note 23.
"4 Rose v. Lundy, 102 S. Ct. 1198, 1203 (1982).
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As Justice Blackmun mentioned in his concurring opinion, previous deci-
sions of the Supreme Court indicate that concern for exhaustion has only ex-
tended to those claims which are to be reviewed by the federal court."' His
position rejects the hypothesis of the Court that exhaustion must be considered
as to the entire petition and supports the theory that exhaustion is only re-
quired as to the individual claims in the petition. Several circuit court opinions
have also taken this position, citing Supreme Court opinions to support their
interpretation of Section 2254(c), that exhausted claims in mixed petitions may
be reviewed." 6 One Supreme Court case which lends support to this inter-
pretation is Picard v. Connor.'" In Picard, the Supreme Court referred alternate-
ly to "the constitutional claim" or "constitutional question,» 118 the "federal
claim,"" 9 and "the claim sought to be vinclicated." 120 More specifically, the
Picard Court stated, "once the federal claim has been fully and fairly presented
to the state courts, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied.'" 21 This language
suggests that the Court was only concerned that the claim before the federal
court for review be exhausted. The Court made no reference to all claims or all
claims in the petition.
Another case which circuit courts have relied on in support of reviewing
exhausted claims in mixed petitions is Gooding v. Wilson. 122 The Supreme Court
heard this case despite the fact that the habeas petition to the district court had
presented both exhausted and unexhausted claims.' 23 Noting that the district
court had only considered the exhausted claim to be ripe for decision, the
Gooding Court addressed only that claim. 12 4 The Court acknowledged that the
petition for federal review had contained both exhausted and unexhausted
claims, 126 but the opinion never mentioned that a mixed petition created prob-
lems in any way. The Lundy Court addressed the Gooding decision only in a
footnote, stating that the case did not control in this situation because the issue
of mixed petitions was not "before the Court" in Gooding. 1 26
In Gooding, however, the Court noted that the federal district court re-
viewed the petitioner's exhausted claim and refused to hear his unexhausted
claims.'" The Gooding Court did not make further reference to the issue of ex-
hausted or unexhausted claims, but proceeded to rule on the claim which the
district court found to be exhausted. The Gooding Court's lack of comment on
" 2
 Id. at 1206.
116 See cases cited supra note 112.
117 404 U.S. 270 (1971).
18 Id. at 272.
16 Id. at 276.
120 Id.
121
 Id. at 275.
122
 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
'" Id. at 519-20.
124 Id.
1 " Id,
126 Rose v. Lundy, 102 S. Ct. at 1201 n.5.
127 Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 519 (1972).
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the issue suggests that, at the time of that decision, the Court did not require
dismissal of mixed petitions, or at least that the review of exhausted claims
while unexhausted claims were outstanding was not a concern of great
magnitude.
Although the Picard and Gooding decisions can be read to indicate that the
Court did not believe total exhaustion was necessary, it is also possible to read
them as if the issue of mixed petitions had not surfaced yet. The Court first
recognized the problem which mixed petitions raise in 1974, in Francisco v.
Gathright. ' 28 The Court found it unnecessary to decide the mixed petition issue
in that case, however, since the unexhausted claims at issue were treated as
though they had been exhausted, as a result of an exception to the exhaustion
doctrine, announced in an earlier case.' 29 Even after Francisco, however,
language in Supreme Court decisions continued to suggest that exhaustion was
required only as to the individual claim to be reviewed by the federal court
rather than as to the petition as a whole.' 3 °
In Pitchess v. Davis, for example, where the petitioner raised only one
claim, the Court dismissed the petition for failure to exhaust."' In so doing,
the Court interpreted the language in Picard to mean that "exhaustion of state
remedies is required as prerequisite to the consideration of each claim sought to
be presented in federal habeas. " 132 As in the Picard decision, there is no indica-
tion that the Court viewed constitutional claims as being joined into one cause
of action and, thus, dealt with alike. On the contrary, the language indicated
that the Court viewed constitutional claims as separate from one another and
that only the claim to be considered need be exhausted.'"
The language concerning exhaustion of claims in Picard and Pitchess as well
as the Court's silence on mixed petitions in Gooding, lends some support to the
theory that district court judges may hear exhausted claims in mixed petitions.
Arguably, however, these sources, like the language of Section 2254(c), are
ambiguous with regard to mixed petitions. Since there is no specific indication
by the Supreme Court prior to Lundy as to how federal district courts should
treat a mixed petition, even a more thorough search than that conducted by the
Lundy Court for the applicability of Section 2254(c) to mixed petitions, fails to
conclusively resolve the issue of the proper response to the question. As the
129 419 U.S. 59, 63-64 (1974) (per curiam).
"9
 Id. In Roberts s. La Vallee, the Court held that when a state statute is found to be un-
constitutional, subsequent to a prisoner's filing a federal habeas petition, the prisoner need not
return to state court to seek relief. 389 U.S. 40 (1967) (per curiam). In Francisco, the Court relied
on Roberts, holding that the petitioner did not have to return to state court to exhaust his claim,
when the statute he was challenging as unconstitutional had been found unconstitutional after he
filed for federal habeas relief. Francisco v. Gathright, 419 U.S. at 63-64.
"° See, e.g., Pitchess v. Davis, 421 U.S. 482 (1975) (per curiam).
' 3 ' 421 U.S. 482, 487 (1975) (per curiam).
'2 Id.
'" Id.
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Lundy Court recognized, an inquiry into the policy considerations which un-
derlie Section 2254(c) is necessary. 134
III. THE EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE: PROMOTION OF
FEDERAL-STATE COMITY
The Lundy Court relied chiefly on the policies underlying the exhaustion
doctrine in deciding how district court judges should handle mixed petitions."'
The Court, in establishing these underlying policies, referred to Ex Parte Royall,
one of the first cases to apply the exhaustion doctrine.' 36
 In Royall, the Court
stated that when federal courts exercise their powers in matters involving state
law, they should do so with deference to the state court so as not to create "un-
necessary conflict between courts equally bound to guard and protect rights
secured by the Constitution."'" When state prisoners petition federal courts
for review of constitutional error, this statement becomes highly relevant.
Because federal review of state criminal convictions suggests interference with
the state court system, the exhaustion doctrine was created to insure that the
federal courts do not interfere unduly with the jurisdiction of the state courts. 138
The Lundy Court reasoned that a rule which requires the dismissal of all
petitions containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims will encourage
prisoners to exhaust all of their claims in state court before petitioning for
federal review.'" In this way, state courts would have "the first opportunity to
review all claims of constitutional error.' "" If prisoners all followed this course
of action, federal courts would not review petitions until the state had fully
decided a petitioner's entire case. Such a result seems on first impression to
fulfill the goals of the exhaustion doctrine, inasmuch as there would be no
federal interference until state litigation on all issues was final.
On closer examination it becomes apparent, however, that the total ex-
haustion rule established in Lundy does not necessarily yield this result. The
rule allows a petitioner to exhaust all of his claims in state court or present only
his exhausted claims to federal court."' If the prisoner does exhaust all of his
claims in state court before petitioning the federal court, then comity is pro-
moted because the state court has a chance to resolve the entire case before the
federal system intervenes. If the prisoner chooses to proceed to federal court
with only his exhausted claims, however, the possibility of state litigation on his
unexhausted claims remains. In this respect, the total exhaustion rule does not
'" Rose v. Lundy, 102 S. Ct. at 1201-02.
"5 Id.
"6 Id. at 1203 (citing Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886)).
" 7 Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. at 251.
'" See, e.g., Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 490-91 (1973); Picard
v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 415-20 (1963).
"9 102 S. Ct. at 1203.
' 4° Id.
'+' Id. at 1199.
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further comity in federal-state relations any more than the rule which the ma-
jority of the circuits espoused prior to the Court's decision.'" These circuits
would hear the exhausted claims and dismiss the unexhausted claims.' 43 The
only difference between the two approaches is that the total exhaustion rule re-
quires the prisoner to amend his complaint while the rule previously followed
by most circuits allowed the judge to dismiss the unexhausted claims. In either
case, the result is the same; the petitioner's exhausted claims are heard and he
is free to return to state court to resolve his unexhausted claims.'" The benefit
of the Lundy rule, then, is only obtained if the prisoner either exhausts all of his
claims in state court, before ever submitting a petition to federal court, or after
a mixed petition is dismissed, he chooses to return to state court to exhaust
those claims rather than amend his petition. If the prisoner followed either of
these two courses, comity would be preserved inasmuch as the state would have
an opportunity to rule on all constitutional claims before the federal system in-
tervened.
The consequences of the Lundy rule may be even more questionable in
light of Supreme Court decisions which reject the idea, that federal courts must
show technical deference to state courts. When a prisoner's petition is dis-
missed because it contains unexhausted claims and he chooses not to amend it
but to return to state court to exhaust all of his claims, a situation involving
technical deference could arise. As the Supreme Court has recognized in
several cases, technical deference by federal courts to state courts does not
always promote comity. 145 For instance, in Roberts v. La Vallee, 146
 the Supreme
Court granted a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner ; even though he had an
available state remedy to pursue."' In Roberts, an indigent petitioner had
challenged the constitutionality of a New York state law which denied him a
free transcript of a hearing at which the State's primary witness had testified.'"
The state courts denied relief.'" By the time the prisoner sought federal habeas
corpus relief, the New York Court of Appeals found the statute to be un-
constitutional.'" The federal district court dismissed the petition, ruling that
due to the change in state law, the prisoner had an available state remedy to
pursue.'" The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the
1 " See cases cited supra note 23.
'" See id.
1 " Rose v. Lundy, 102 S. Ct. at 1199. If the rule as proposed by Justice O'Connor had
obtained a majority, dismissal of a mixed petition would have made any of the claims included in
that petition subject to the abuse of the writ standard of Rule 9(b) in any subsequent petition for
federal habeas corpus review. Id, at 1204-05.
145 See, e.g., Francisco v. Gathright, 419 U.S. 59 (1974); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S.
40 (1967).
146
 389 U.S. 40 (1967).
147
 Id. at 41-42.
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decision.'" The Supreme Court, however, reversed.'" Although the Court
recognized that technically a state remedy was available to the prisoner, the
Court found the claim to be exhausted for the purposes of federal review since
more state litigation would only be "unnecessarily time-consuming and other-
wise burdensome" to the state. "4 The Court stated further that there would be
no "substantial state interest in ruling once again on the petitioner's case. "155
Apparently, the Supreme Court did not believe that technical deference to the
state court would promote comity in this situation.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the Roberts decision in Francisco v.
Gathright. 156 In Francisco, the petitioner presented two claims of constitutional
error to the district court."' One of the claims was that a Virginia statute was
uneonstitutional. 158
 After the petitioner filed for federal habeas review, the
state court found the statute to be unconstitutional.'" Holding that Roberts v.
LaVallee' 6° controlled, the Supreme Court disagreed with the courts below that
the claim of statutory unconstitutionality should be resubmitted to the state
court."' Referring to both of these cases, the Court stated that "the policies
served by the exhaustion requirement would not be furthered by requiring
resubmission of the claims to the state courts.'"" The Roberts and Francisco
cases were concerned with whether a constitutional claim should be resub-
mitted to state court, following a change in state law before federal review is
proper.'" The Court determined in these cases that technical deference to state
courts does not always promote federal-state comity. After Lundy, mixed peti-
tions may present a similar problem when a prisoner chooses to return to state
court to exhaust his claims. When a prisoner's mixed petition contains
meritorious claims which have been exhausted and frivolous claims which have
not been exhausted, the total exhaustion rule requires dismissal. Consequent-
ly, the frivolous claims are sent back to the state court system, imposing an un-
necessary and time-consuming burden on the state.'" The rule previously
followed by a majority of the circuits avoided this result; the frivolous claims
would have been dismissed, and the meritorious claims reviewed.'"
"2 Id.
1S3 Id. at 42.
'" Id. at 43.
'" Id.
136 419 U.S. 59 (1974).
157 Id. at 60.
1 " Id.
'" Id. at 60-61.
'66 389 U.S. 40 (1967).
16 ' Francisco v. Gathright, 419 U.S. at 62-63.
' 62 Id. at 63.
163 Francisco v. Gathright, 419 U.S. 59 (1974); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40
(1967).
164 This very problem was recognized by the Second Circuit in United States ex rel. Levy
v. McMann, 394 F.2d 402, 404 (2d Cir. 1968) (unexhausted claim frivolous, therefore dismissal
of mixed petition would waste both state's and prisoner's time).
' 61 Id.
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The Lundy Court's failure to consider a situation in which the state would
be required to adjudicate frivolous claims suggests that the argument that the
total exhaustion rule will further comity is not as strong as the Court's presen-
tation purports. The Lundy Court argued that the total exhaustion rule would
allow state courts to "become increasingly familiar with and hospitable toward
federal constitutional issues." 166 Certainly, this objective will not be obtained if
state courts are required to adjudicate frivolous claims, since such claims would
not raise important constitutional questions.
As Justice Stevens observed in his dissent, the Lundy Court "assumes that
the character of all claims alleged in habeas petitions is the same."' 67 This
assumption, however, is unreliable. In fact, claims of vastly different substan-
tive merit and procedural history are brought under habeas corpus and thus,
the total exhaustion rule will promote comity only in some situations. If the
prisoner exhausts all of his claims before petitioning for federal review, the
federal interference with state processes is minimal. Once the prisoner drafts a
mixed petition, however, the effect of the rule is less clear. If the prisoner
deletes his unexhausted claims and proceeds in federal court, the effect of the
rule is the same as if the judge himself deleted the unexhausted claims.'" If the
prisoner returns to state court to exhaust his claims, the effect of the rule
depends on the character of the petitioner's claims. If the unexhausted claims
are frivolous, the rule works against comity, by imposing an unnecessary
burden on state courts.
Consequently, the benefits of the total exhaustion rule in promoting
federal-state comity are less significant than the Lundy Court indicated. The
Court also asserted, however, that the new rule would be more efficient and
less burdensome on the federal court system. The validity of this conclusion
will be discussed in the following section. •
IV. BENEFITS TO THE FEDERAL COURTS
The Lundy Court argued not only that the total exhaustion rule would
benefit the state courts and promote comity in federal-state relations, but also
that the rule would decrease the burden which habeas petitions from state
courts impose on federal judges, thereby promoting judicial efficiency at the
federal level.'" According to the Court, efficiency would be promoted because
federal judges would not have to distinguish between related and unrelated
claims,"° as the rule followed by a majority of the circuits required them to
do."' The majority rule, prior to Lundy, was to dismiss even exhausted claims
1 " Rose v. Lundy, 102 S. Ct. 1198, 1203 (1982).
'" Id. at 1215-16.
I" See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
169 102 S. Ct. at 1203-04.
' 7° Id.
i" See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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if they were related to an unexhausted claim. 12 The total exhaustion rule,
however, does not require any distinction between related and unrelated
claims, since a petition with an unexhausted claim would automatically be
dismissed.
Justice Blackmun argued, however, that the total exhaustion rule would
work against judicial efficiency.'" He reasoned that some preliminary assess-
ment of the petition is necessary under either the total exhaustion rule or the
rule previously followed ' by most of the circuits. 14 Under both rules, he
asserted, federal judges at least have to determine whether claims have been
exhausted or not"' before they can take any action on the petition. Justice
Blackmun argued that this preliminary review of the petition is, in some in-
stances, sufficient for the district judge to dispose of an exhausted claim once
and for all.'" Thus, under the rule followed by a majority of the circuits, a
federal judge in his preliminary review, could locate and dispose of a peti-
tioner's claim which, though properly exhausted, was not deserving of any fur-
ther review.'" The total exhaustion rule, in contrast, requires that the entire
petition be dismissed once any unexhausted claims are located, regardless of
the nature of the exhausted claims.'" For this reason, Justice Blackmun noted
that, under the total exhaustion rule, the preliminary time which a federal
judge must spend to determine whether a petition contains only exhausted
claims, is time lost if there are any unexhausted claims in the petition. 19 Fur-
thermore, if a mixed petition is dismissed, the exhausted claims, whether
frivolous or meritorious, may be presented to the federal district court again
either after the prisoner amends his petition in accordance with the total ex-
haustion rule, or after he exhausts his remaining state claims.'" Consequently,
under the Lundy rule, a mixed petition would never be completely disposed of
as a result of the initial consideration by the federal court. For this reason, it is
difficult to understand why the Lundy Court predicted that federal judges would
save time under the new rule. Justice Blackmun's analysis seems largely cor-
rect that the Court's new rule will not decrease but may, in fact, increase the
burden on federal judges.
The Lundy Court also argued that the total exhaustion rule would en-
courage state prisoners to exhaust all claims and, therefore, when the petition
was ripe for federal habeas review, the federal judge would have a more com-
plete factual record."' This assertion presumes, however, that petitioners
'" See id.




'" Id. This conclusion is apparently what Justice Blackmun was referring to.
18 Id. at 1199.
179 Id. at 1208.
'a° Id.
181 Id. at 1203-04.
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would comply with the rule. Again, the Court did not project what the impact
would be on the federal court if the prisoner did not exhaust all of his claims in
state court. If a prisoner chose to present only his exhausted claims to the
federal district court, as the total exhaustion rule allows, the record that the
federal judge would receive would be the same as that which he would receive
under the rule followed by a majority of the circuits. In either case, the record
would not be as complete as if the prisoner had exhausted all claims in state
court. Moreover, in either case, the record may have been as complete as
necessary to decide the exhausted issues. In any event, federal judges have
always had discretion to summarily dismiss a petition or order the record to be
expanded. 182
 Any deficiencies in the record, therefore, could be corrected after
the petition is presented to the federal court. The Lundy rule, then, adds little if
anything to judicial efficiency in this respect.
Not only is the Lundy rule not necessary to insure a complete record, but
the rule could also have a detrimental effect on the ability of the federal courts
to understand when a given petition is ripe for federal review. As Justice
Blackmun indicated, resolution on the merits may be more difficult if the
record on the exhausted claims becomes stale as a result of the delay which en-
sues when the petitioner seeks to exhaust his unexhausted claims or waits for
his amended petition to come up for review again.'"
In sum, the Court's argument that benefits will inure to federal judges as
a result of the total exhaustion rule, again ignores the substantive and pro-
cedural idiosyncracies of the habeas corpus process. Furthermore, the rule
either overlooks or underestimates the ability of the federal judge to use his
discretion in determining when a record is sufficiently developed for review and
when a mixed petition should be dismissed or reviewed.
The Lundy Court apparently did not consider the adverse effects which the
total exhaustion rule could have on judicial efficiency or for that matter on
federal-state relations. The Court's oversight of the need for flexibility in deal-
ing with habeas questions is unusual in light of the fact that it has often em-
phasized the need for such flexibility. One instance of the Court's recognition
of the need for flexibility in applying the habeas statute on the question of ex-
haustion is the Court's ruling in Brown v. Allen. 184
 An issue before the Court in
that case was whether a prisoner must pursue any remedies which the state
may offer beyond the normal appellate procedure before he is deemed to have
exhausted state remedies within the meaning of Section 2254 of the habeas
statute. 185
 Section 2254(c) of the statute states that "an applicant may not be
deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, . .
if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available pro-
182
 28 U.S.C. 5 2254, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 7 (1976).
183 102 S. Ct. at 1208.
' 04
 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
185 Id. at 447.
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cedure, the question presented. „186 In Brown, the Court construed this
language to mean that the requirement of "all available state remedies” is met
once the state supreme court has decided the prisoner's claim adversely to him
and the Supreme Court of the United States has denied application for cer-
tiorari.'" The Brown Court found it implausible that Congress would have in-
tended that state prisoners make repetitious applications to state court.'" The
Brown Court did not read the exhaustion requirement literally to mean that a
state prisoner must pursue every available state remedy.'"
Moreover, the need for flexibility in dealing with habeas petitions and the
impractibility of the Court's "rigorous" rule are evident from the experiences
of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits. Although these two circuits have purported to
follow a total exhaustion rule, both circuits have recognized the need to make
exceptions to the requirement that all mixed petitions be dismissed.'" In
Galtieri v. Wainwright, the Fifth Circuit held that if a district court mistakenly
considers the merits of an exhausted claim and there are unexhausted claims in
the petition, the Court of Appeals may review the exhausted claim on the
merits.'" The Court of Appeals noted that the problem would only be further
aggravated if they refused to review the exhausted claim.'" The Court stated
that, "Exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine have been developed judicially to
cover situations where mechanical adherence would not further the goal of the
exhaustion doctrine or would frustrate an overriding federal claim."'"
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit, in Gonzales v. Stone, held that a district court
must decline to consider any issues raised in a habeas petition until every issue
has been exhausted.'" In Gonzales, the court noted, however, that the rule is
not inflexible, stating that if a prisoner has a reasonable explanation for failure
to allege the unexhausted claims in earlier state proceedings, then considera-
tion of fairness may require the court to examine the exhausted claims while
refusing to hear the unexhausted claims. 195
Thus, both the Supreme Court and the circuit courts have recognized the
need for flexibility in resolving habeas questions. Even those circuits which
have attempted to follow a total exhaustion rule have developed exceptions to
their rule. The Lundy Court in construing the exhaustion requirement strictly
appears to have overlooked both its own earlier holdings regarding flexibility in
'" 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) (1976).
187 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. at 447-49 & n.3.
188 Id. at 448-49 & n.3.
189 The requirements for exhaustion of state remedies were relaxed even further by the
Supreme Court when the Court held that the exhaustion doctrine does not require a state
prisoner to seek certiorari in the Supreme Court before seeking federal habeas corpus relief. Fay
v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 398 (1963).
"° See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
'" 582 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1978).
'". Id. at 362.
193 Id. at 354.
14 546 F.2d 807, 810 (9th Cir. 1976).
195 Id. at 809 (dictum).
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dealing with habeas corpus proceedings and the practical problems which a
rigid rule engenders. Furthermore, as the next section will suggest, the rigidity
of the rule may have serious implications for the rights of the prisoner in con-
travention of the very purpose of the habeas corpus doctrine.
V. THE PRISONER'S INTEREST
The Lundy Court's failure to consider the variety of habeas petitions to the
federal courts may be explained in part by the mode of analysis of the Court's
opinion. At the very outset of its opinion, the Court justified the total exhaus-
tion rule by stating that "a rule requiring exhaustion of all claims furthers the
purposes underlying the habeas statute. "196 In its analysis, however, the Court
did not show how the purposes of the habeas statute are furthered, but rather
how the purposes of the exhaustion doctrine are furthered. By focusing solely
on those sections of the statute pertinent to exhaustion, the Court ignored the
most fundamental purpose of the statute — to provide speedy relief to the
prisoner.' 97 Throughout the opinion, the Court overlooked the fact that the ex-
haustion doctrine is only part of the judicial response to state prisoners seeking
federal habeas relief.
The Court, however, did not discuss the need to balance the concern for
comity with the prisoner's right to relief. The Court cited Braden v. 30th Judicial
Circuit Court to underscore the point that the exhaustion doctrine's purpose is
to promote comity.'" While the Braden Court did reaffirm this long-
acknowledged principle, that Court also put the purpose of the exhaustion doc-
trine in its proper perspective. As the Braden Court noted, "The exhaustion
doctrine is a judicially crafted instrument which reflects a careful balance be-
tween important interests of federalism and the need to preserve the writ of
habeas corpus as a 'swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal confine-
ment' " . 199
The rigid rule of total exhaustion as proposed by the Lundy Court, con-
trary to former Supreme Court decisions, does not give sufficient consideration
to the need to preserve the writ of habeas corpus as a swift and imperative
remedy. The Supreme Court has recognized in the past that in order to effec-
tuate this right, unnecessary procedural hurdles to habeas corpus relief must
not be tolerated.n° For example, in Fay v. Noia, the Court gave great weight to
196
 Rose v. Lundy, 102 S. Ct. 1198, 1199 (1982).
1 " See, e.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485-86 (1969); Carafas v. LaVallec, 391
U.S. 234, 238.40 (1968); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 58-60 (1968); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391, 399-402 (1963); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 712-13 (1961); Bowen v. Johnston, 306
U.S. 19, 26 (1939).
I"
 102 S. Ct. at 1203 (citing Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit, 410 U.S. 484, 490-91
(1973)).
199
	 U.S. at 490 (quoting Secretary of State for Home Affairs v. O'Brien 1923, A.C.
603, 609 (H.L.)).
200 See, e.g., Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 63-64 (1968); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,
435-36 (1963).
1360	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 24:1339
the prisoner's interest in striking down the requirement that state prisoners
must seek certiorari in the Supreme Court before petitioning for federal
relief. 201 Furthermore, the Fay Court held, "our decision today affects all pro-
cedural hurdles to the achievement of swift and imperative justice of habeas
corpus.... " 202 Similarly, the Court struck down a ruling which held that
prisoners held in custody may not attack future consecutive sentences. 203 The
Court held in Peyton v. Rowe, that common sense dictates that prisoners seeking
habeas corpus relief after exhausting state remedies must do so at the earliest
time practicable. 204
The Lundy Court gave little consideration to the prisoner's interest in
federal habeas relief, despite the emphasis which prior decisions have accorded
that interest. Both the Peyton and Fay decisions stressed the necessity to make
federal habeas review readily available and accessible to the state prisoner.
Moreover, it is ironic that the Lundy Court relied on Braden v. 30th Judicial Cir-
cuit Court to assert and define the power of the exhaustion doctrine, for the
Braden Court cautioned that the exhaustion doctrine "cannot be used as a
blunderbluss to shatter the attempt at litigation of constitutional claims without
regard to the purpose that underlies the doctrine and called it into exis-
tence. ,,205
Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens agreed that the total exhaustion rule
may impair the prisoner's rights. 2" Justice Blackmun noted that the prisoner's
right to speedy relief is impaired if the prisoner must go back to state court to
adjudicate unexhausted claims. 207 Moreover, he argued, the Court's rule
assumed that all prisoners are litigious and are abusing the habeas corpus
system to get more than one day in court."' In addition, Justice Blackmun
maintained that many pro se petitioners may not be aware of the option to
amend their petitions if dismissed because they are mixed."' A petitioner may
have to depend on an instruction from the judge to amend his petition by
deleting his unexhausted claims."' Even in this case, the petitioner still may
have to wait in line again until his revised petition comes up again for review.
Furthermore, if the petitioner is unaware of his option to amend the petition,
he may waste time going back to state court to exhaust frivolous claims in state
201 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 400-02 (1963). Before the Fay decision, the Supreme
Court had held that prisoners must seek certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States
before petitioning the federal courts for review, in order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement.
Darr v. Burford, 399 U.S. 200 (1950), overruled, Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
202 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 435-36.
209
	 v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968).
2°' Id. at 63-64. This decision overruled McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934).
2"s
	
v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 490 (1973).
2" 102 S. Ct. at 1208-09 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 1218-20
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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court.'" Justice Stevens argued that any delay in resolving a petitioner's ex-
hausted claims because unexhausted claims had to undergo another round of
review in state court would be "truly outrageous" if the exhausted claims were
meritorious."'
Under the new rule, the prisoner himself must distinguish between ex-
hausted and unexhausted claims in order to avoid having his petition dis-
missed. It is difficult to understand how the Lundy Court did not find this re-
quirement to impair the prisoner's interest in light of the fact that the Court
implied that distinguishing between claims is often a difficult and burdensome
task for federal judges.'" The burden which the judges sustained may merely
be shifted to the prisoners under the new rule, as Justice Blackmun sug-
gested.'"
As noted above, the total exhaustion rule may jeopardize the basic func-
tion of habeas corpus. Since the rule is difficult for prisoners to understand, the
delays which are inherent in the rule may involve even more needless delays.
This problem is especially unfortunate if a prisoner has meritorious claims
which are unnecessarily delayed, or, worse, abandoned. Although the Court's
purpose may be to avoid frivolous and repetitious claims, the new rule does not
accomplish that goal. The total exhaustion rule adheres to strict procedural
requirements regardless of the nature of the prisoner's claim. As Justice
Stevens suggested in his dissent, personal liberty may be sacrificed because of
mere procedural hurdles.'" If the Court had addressed the mixed petition issue
with the purpose of habeas corpus in mind, balancing it against the interests of
comity, it would probably have achieved a more flexible rule which would work
less hardship on the prisoner's interests.
CONCLUSION
The way in which a mixed petition should be treated by a federal court is
not addressed in the federal habeas corpus statute. Although earlier Supreme
Court opinions are also ambiguous where mixed petitions are concerned, there
are some cases which support the view that a federal district judge may proper-
ly review the exhausted claims in the petition. This approach is preferable to
the total exhaustion rule because it can promote the interests of comity and the
interests of the prisoner with greater flexibility. This flexibility is needed
because the nature of the claims in one petition will vary from those in another.
A flexible approach can adequately preserve the interest of comity in federal-
state relations, since unexhausted claims will be dismissed. The rigidity of the
total exhaustion rule will not always serve the purposes of comity because a
"' Id.
2 t 1 Id. at 1217.
2 " Id. at 1204.
214 Id. at 1209-10.
21 ' Id. at 1218-20.
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state court may have to spend time reviewing frivolous claims. A more flexible
approach also allows the district court judge to use his time more efficiently, in
many instances. The total exhaustion rule does not allow the judge to act on a
mixed petition in any way, despite the possibility that his first review of the
petition might allow resolution of claims. The total exhaustion rule will only
promote comity and judicial efficiency if the state prisoner always exhausts all
of his claims in state court before petitioning for federal review. Consequently,
the rule imposes a burden on the prisoner. A prisoner who does not understand
the rule and its consequences may waste his time and that of the state court ex-
hausting frivolous claims. Moreover, by doing so, the prisoner's constitutional
guarantee to a speedy determination as to the legality of his detention may be
jeopardized.
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